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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1963 the Supreme Court of California revolutionized the law of
torts by adopting the theory of strict liability in products liability
cases.' The American Law Institute subsequently promulgated section
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts in 1965. Section 402A pro-
vides that the seller of a "product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous" may be held liable even though he has "exercised all possi-
ble care."'2 Today, nearly every state has adopted some form of section
1. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT OF TORTS].
Section 402A states:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or
consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the
ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in
the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible caro in the preparation and sale of his product,
and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual
relation with the seller.
Id.
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402A.' Moreover, the list of modern products to which section 402A ap-
plies is virtually limitless.4 Yet, despite the unprecedented expansion of
strict liability into new product areas and industries, 5 courts still must
grapple with defining the limits of section 402A in certain unique fac-
tual situations. The increasing variety and complexity of manufactured
items have created problems for courts;6 some items do not fall neatly
within the label of "product."
Recently, courts have had to decide whether the content of an arti-
cle of property used to transmit information constitutes a product for
section 402A purposes. Some courts have applied strict liability to pub-
lications that contain erroneous information which has caused injury to
plaintiffs.' These courts argue that the underlying policy justifications
for strict liability compel this application.' Other courts have refused to
extend the doctrine of strict liability to cover "defective" ideas and
words in a publication." These courts contend that strict liability only
applies to the tangible properties of publications, not the words and
thoughts contained within the publication. 0 Because the physical
properties of a book contain no inherent danger, strict liability arguably
is not applicable.""
This Note explores the issue of whether strict liability is appropri-
ate for defective ideas in publications. Part II examines the develop-
ment of strict liability and the underlying policy justifications for the
doctrine. Part III analyzes cases that have considered the applicability
of strict liability to various publications. Part IV examines the implica-
tions of imposing strict liability on publications. Finally, Part V con-
cludes that strict liability should not be applied to publications that
3. See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEErON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 98, at 694 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEE'TON].
4. See, e.g., Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 47 Ill. 2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897 (1970)
(blood); Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 92 Ill. App. 3d 136, 414 N.E.2d 1302 (1980)
(grain storage tank); Kelley v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 304 Md. 124, 497 A.2d 1143 (1985) ("Saturday
Night Special" handgun); Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc., 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697 (1969) (permanent
wave solution); Ransome v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 87 Wis. 2d 605, 275 N.W.2d 641 (1979)
(electricity); see also 2 J. DOOLEY, MODERN TORT LAW: LIABIITY & LITIGATION § 32.41 (1983 &
Supp. 1988) (stating that "[a] complete list of products which have been held not covered by strict
liability would be substantially shorter than the list of products that are covered by the doctrine"
(emphasis in original)).
5. See Walker, The Expanding Applicability of Strict Liability Principles: How Is a
"Product" Defined?, 22 TORT & INS. L.J. 1 (1986).
6. Id. at 15.
7. See, e.g., Brocklesby v. United States, 753 F.2d 794 (9th Cir.), amended on other
grounds, 767 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1101 (1986).
8. Id. at 802.
9. See, e.g., Cardozo v. True, 342 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
10. Id. at 1056.
11. Id.
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contain defective ideas.
II. POLICIEs BEHIND STRICT LIABILITY
A. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products and Its Progeny
Prior to 1963 products liability cases were tried either under a war-
ranty12 or a traditional negligence theory.'3 Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products14 began a trend in products liability cases of focusing on the
character of the good rather than on the conduct of the manufacturer.',
In Greenman the plaintiff was injured severely while using an all-pur-
pose power tool. A piece of wood clamped to the machine flew out and
hit the plaintiff on the head while he was using the power tool as a
lathe. Writing for the majority, Justice Roger Traynor held that the
plaintiff's cause of action was not barred by his failure to give timely
notice of breach of warranty because "[a] manufacturer is strictly liable
in tort when an article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be
used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes
injury to a human being."' 6 The California court largely based its deci-
sion to impose strict liability on public policy grounds. The manufac-
turer was deemed to be in a better position to absorb the costs of
injuries caused by its products than was the individual consumer.1
Various courts have expanded the reasoning of Greenman and have
found additional policy justifications for strict liability-justifications
which are incorporated in Restatement section 402A.i s These policy
reasons were enumerated by an Arizona appellate court in Lechuga,
12. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
13. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
14. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
15. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 3, § 99, at 695.
16. Greenman, 59 Cal. 2d at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
17. Id. at 63-64, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701. After giving the reasons for rejecting a
warranty theory in favor of strict liability, Justice Traynor stated: "The purpose of such liability is
to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the manufactur-
ers that put such products on the market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to
protect themselves." Id. at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701; see also Escola v. Coca Cola
Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944) (Traynor, J', concurring). Justice Tray-
nor emphasized the manufacturer's superior ability to understand the risks in its product. He
noted:
As handicrafts have been replaced by mass production with its great markets and transporta-
tion facilities, the close relationship between the producer and consumer of a product has
been altered. Manufacturing processes, frequently valuable secrets, are ordinarily inaccessible
to or beyond the ken of the general public. The consumer no longer has means or skill enough
to investigate for himself the soundness of a product. . .. The manufacturer's obligation to
the consumer must keep pace with the changing relationship between them ....
Id. at 467, 150 P.2d at 443-44 (citations omitted).
18. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 3, § 98, at 693.
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Inc. v. Montgomery.19 Strict liability, in short, was designed to be a
doctrine of social utility. It was intended to be an instrument of social
policy in promoting fairness, justice, and efficiency. 0
Despite the numerous policy reasons behind strict products liabil-
ity, perhaps the most important justification for the doctrine is that it
eliminates the necessity of proving negligence. 21 The essential difference
between negligence and strict liability is the element of scienter, or
knowledge, of the dangerous conditions of the product.22 In a negligence
products liability action, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant
failed to exercise due care either in the manufacture of the product or
in the failure to discover and correct its dangerous condition.23 In a
strict products liability cause of action, the plaintiff must prove only
that the product was in an unreasonably dangerous defective condition
when it left the control of the manufacturer or seller and that the de-
fect was the proximate cause of his injury.24 This evidentiary burden is
much easier for the plaintiff to meet 25 and can be illustrated best by
19. 12 Ariz. App. 32, 467 P.2d 256 (1970). The court enumerated the policy reasons for strict
liability as follows:
(1) The manufacturer can anticipate some hazards and guard against their recurrence, which
the consumer cannot do.
(2) The cost of injury may be overwhelming to the person injured while the risk of injury can
be insured by the manufacturer and be distributed among the public as a cost of doing
business.
(3) It is in the public interest to discourage the marketing of defective products.
(4) It is in the public interest to place responsibility for injury upon the manufacturer who
was responsible for its reaching the market.
(5) That this responsibility should also be placed upon the retailer and wholesaler of the
defective product in order that they may act as the conduit through which liability may flow
to reach the manufacturer, where ultimate responsibility lies.
(6) That because of the complexity of the present day manufacturing processes and their
secretiveness, the ability to prove negligent conduct by the injured plaintiff is almost
impossible.
(7) That the consumer does not have the ability to investigate for himself the soundness of
the product.
(8) That the consumer's vigilance has been lulled by advertising, marketing devices and
trademarks.
Id. at 37-38, 467 P.2d at 261-62 (citations omitted).
20. Symposium on Products Liability, 57 MARQ. L. REV. 623, 624 (1974); see also PROSSER &
KE=rON, supra note 3, § 98, at 693.
21. See Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 460, 155 N.W.2d 55, 63 (1967). As the Wisconsin
Supreme Court noted in adopting section 402A, the "most beneficial aspect" of strict liability is
that it removes the injured plaintiff's burden of "proving specific acts of negligence and protects
him from the defenses of notice of breach, disclaimer, and lack of privity." Id.
22. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 850 (1973).
23. Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5 (1965).
24. See P. Keeton, Manufacturer's Liability: The Meaning of "Defect" in the Manufacture
and Design of Products, 20 SYRACUSE L. REV. 559 (1969).
25. Wade, supra note 22, at 826.
560
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reference to the facts of Greenman v. Yuba Power Products.6 For the
plaintiff in Greenman to have prevailed under a negligence theory, he
would have had to show that the defendant knew or should have known
that the design and manufacture of the machine was such that inade-
quate set screws would cause the tailstock to move away from the wood
and, thus, cause the piece to fly out of the machine. For the plaintiff
to have prevailed under a negligence theory would have entailed show-
ing a failure on the part of one of the manufacturer's employees to exer-
cise ordinary care in the assembly line or in the final inspection
process.28 To hold the supplier of the power tool liable, the plaintiff
would have had to show that the supplier was negligent in failing to
discover the dangerous condition of the product.2" Given the complexity
of the mass production and distribution cycle, negligence would have
been nearly impossible to prove.30 Thus, requiring proof of negligence
often is unfair to an injured plaintiff by causing him to lose a remedy
while a manufacturer, who is in a superior position to bear the cost
caused by its defective product, escapes liability."' Strict liability elimi-
nates this inordinate evidentiary burden by focusing on the defect in
the product and, in effect, imputing knowledge of the risk of harm to
the manufacturer.2
B. Modern Theory
Although the language expressly limiting the application of Re-
statement section 402A to "[o]ne who sells any product"3 3 appears
straightforward, it has caused problems for courts faced with factual
situations that do not fall within the literal language of the section.3 4
The drafters' attempts at defining this language could produce only a
list of products covered, not a comprehensive definition. 5 Faced with
this uncertainty, various courts use different approaches in determining
whether a particular good in a particular transaction constitutes a
"product" for the purposes of section 402A. One approach is a transac-
tion analysis, focusing on whether a given transaction involves the sale
26. For a discussion of Greenman, see supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
27. Wade, supra note 23, at 16.
28. Wade, supra note 22, at 825-26.
29. Id. at 826.
30. Id.
31. Walker, supra note 5, at 3.
32. See Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 430, 573 P.2d 443, 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225,
236 (1978).
33. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, supra note 2, § 402A.
34. Maloney, What Is or Is Not a Product Within the Meaning of Section 402A, 57 MARQ. L.
REV. 625, 626 (1974).
35. Id.
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of a product or the rendering of a service. 6 A second approach is a
product analysis, focusing on whether a given good should be character-
ized as a product.3 7 These approaches are not satisfactory because they
are overly definitional. Additionally, courts often confuse the two analy-
ses, deciding that a good should not be labeled a product because the
transaction involved the rendering of a service more than the sale of a
product. 8
The most popular approach is to define the "sale of a product" for
purposes of section 402A entirely in terms of the social policy justifica-
tions for the imposition of strict liability.3 9 In other words, when the
public policies underlying strict liability apply, the court will label the
transaction as the sale of a product for the purposes of section 402A.4°
Thus, in deciding whether to impose strict liability on a particular de-
fendant, most courts look to factors including risk spreading, economic
incentives to make safe products, and the problem plaintiffs face in
proving a negligence case.41 If these public policies do not apply, the
courts will deem the transaction to be a service because section 402A
applies only to sales.42 In short, as strict liability has evolved as a pow-
erful instrument of fairness, justice, and social utility, the underlying
social policies have become the definition of a "product."4
Defining a product in terms of the public policies behind strict lia-
bility gives courts a great deal of flexibility when faced with unique fac-
tual situations. A court can delineate the parameters of strict liability
based on its view of the nature of the item involved and the nature of
the defendant.44 Courts often act as super-legislatures in evaluating cer-
tain products and industries.45 In many cases, a court's classification
will have a tremendous impact on the creation and development of new
industries and products. Additionally, the classification may determine
36. Wunsch, The Definition of a Product for the Purposes of Section 402A, 50 INS. COUNS. J.
344, 345 (1983).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See id. at 344; Maloney, supra note 34, at 626; Walker, supra note 5, at 4. For a list of
the policy justifications for strict products liability, see supra note 19 and accompanying text.
40. See Maloney, supra note 34, at 627.
41. Walker, supra note 5, at 12.
42. See Wunsch, supra note 36, at 345.
43. See Maloney, supra note 34, at 627.
44. See Walker, supra note 5, at 2.
45. Id. As San Francisco products liability lawyer Gary T. Walker has noted:
If the court believes that public policy will best be served by protecting a particular industry
or profession, then the defendant's activity will be considered a service. However, if the court
favors protection of the consumer rather than the industry or profession involved, then the
defendant will have manufactured or sold a product.
[Vol. 42:557
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whether a given product or industry survives.46 Given the courts' broad
discretion in deciding whether the policies behind strict liability apply
to a particular product, it is not surprising that there has been a dis-
cernible trend on the part of many courts to expand strict liability.47
Despite the fact that the public policy approach has allowed for an
expansive interpretation of what constitutes a product for purposes of
section 402A, in nearly every case courts have considered goods that
contain some inherent harm. In other words, regardless of whether the
product was Mr. Greenman's defective power tool,48 an untempered
shower door,49 a spoiled egg salad sandwich,50 or numerous other exam-
ples, the product itself caused the physical injury. A Pennsylvania court
has noted that a reading of the comments to section 402A indicates that
the only products which fall under the section are those which them-
selves are dangerous and cause physical harm to the plaintiff or his
property." For example, a plaintiff would not be able to recover in
strict products liability for jewelry stolen from his home when a burglar
alarm system purchased and installed by the defendant failed to oper-
ate properly.2 However, if the same burglar alarm system had defective
wiring which caused a fire and destroyed the plaintiff's house, the plain-
tiff would have a claim under section 402A.5 s In this second example,
the product itself is the injury-producing agent, and its inherently de-
fective properties caused the harm. Given the fact that nearly every
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See id. at 2-5.
49. Becker v. IRM Corp., 38 Cal. 3d 454, 698 P.2d 116, 213 Cal. Rptr. 213 (1985).
50. Watchel v. Rosol, 159 Conn. 496, 271 A.2d 84 (1970).
51. Lobianco v. Property Protection, Inc., 9 Pa. D. & C.3d 655 (1978); see also RESTATEMENT
OF TORTS, supra note 2, § 402A comment d. Comment d states:
The rule stated in this Section is not limited to the sale of food for human consumption, or
other products for intimate bodily use, although it will obviously include them. It extends to
any product sold in the condition, or substantially the same condition, in which it is expected
to reach the ultimate user or consumer. Thus the rule stated applies to an automobile, a tire,
an airplane, a grinding wheel, a water heater, a gas stove, a power tool, a riveting machine, a
chair, and an insecticide. It applies also to products which, if they are defective, may be ex-
pected to and do cause only "physical harm" in the form of damage to the user's land or
chattels, as in the case of animal food or a herbicide.
Id.
52. Lobianco, 9 Pa. D. & C.3d at 660. The court noted:
It is immediately apparent from the foregoing language that this section [402A] does not
apply in the present case. Defendant's product was not dangerous and did not cause any
physical harm to plaintiff or her property. A reading of the comment to the section supports
the conclusion that the only products which come under the section are those which cause
physical harm, such as food which causes illness, bottles which explode or a defective automo-
bile tire which causes an accident.
Id.
53. Id.
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products liability case involves harm caused by the inherent physical
flaws in the product itself, the courts face a difficult problem when con-
fronted with strict liability claims based on the potential for harm
caused by erroneous statements in a publication. These cases caused
various courts to examine whether they should extend the doctrine of
strict liability beyond the parameters which likely were envisioned by
the drafters of the Restatement.5 4
III. APPLICATION OF STRICT LIABILITY TO PUBLICATIONS
A. Books, Magazines, and Newspapers
One of the first cases addressing the issue of strict liability for "de-
fective" ideas in books was Cardozo v. True.5 5 In Cardozo the purchaser
of a cookbook sued the retail dealer alleging breach of implied war-
ranty. As the Florida Second District Court of Appeals noted, an action
for breach of implied warranty is an action for liability without fault.5 6
The plaintiff alleged that while following a recipe in the cookbook, she
tested a raw piece of the Dasheen plant and suffered burning in her
mouth and throat, gasping and coughing, and severe stomach cramps
which continued for several days, despite medical treatment.5 Her
breach of implied warranty claim was that the book was not reasonably
fit for its intended purpose, due to inadequate instructions and a failure
to warn that the Dasheen plant was poisonous until cooked.58 The Flor-
ida court, while noting that "books are goods,"'5 9 denied the plaintiff's
implied warranty claim. The court distinguished between the tangible
properties of the book and the ideas conveyed within the book. 0 The
court said that the defendant had impliedly warranted the tangible
properties of the book, including the printing and the binding, but not
the ideas and thoughts contained in the book."' In short, the court re-
mained consistent with the body of case law which seems to indicate
that strict liability is appropriate only when the injury is caused by the
inherent physical defects in the product itself.2
The underlying rationale for the Cardozo decision was that ideas
54. For a full discussion of these cases, see infra notes 55-148 and accompanying text.
55. 342 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
56. Id. at 1056.
57. Id. at 1054.
58. Id. at 1055.
59. Id. at 1056.
60. Id.
61. Id.; see also Pacific Indem. Co. v. Linn, 766 F.2d 754, 765 (3d Cir. 1985) (noting that
there is a question as to whether a diet book can be a product within the meaning of products
liability law).
62. See supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 42:557564
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"are not equivalent to commercial products." 63 For liability to attach
under section 402A, the mere sale of a product accompanying the words
is insufficient because there can be no strict liability imposed on the
words themselves.6 4 The court stated that "ideas hold a privileged posi-
tion in our society," and books, magazines, and newspapers perform a
"unique and essential function."65 To hold book publishers or newspa-
per owners strictly liable would impede the free flow of ideas in society
severely.6 Thus, absent proof that the seller knew of a possible reason
to warn the public about the contents of a book, the implied strict lia-
bility warranty of fitness is limited to the physical properties of the
book and does not extend to the words and ideas communicated within
the book.6 7 It appears that ideas may have a higher place in the hierar-
chy of judicial concerns than the cost distribution policies behind strict
liability.
In 1981 a New York court heard a novel section 402A strict liability
claim involving a fourth grade science textbook in Walter v. Bauer."
The child plaintiff suffered eye injuries while performing a science ex-
periment described in the textbook involving a ruler and rubber bands.
The plaintiff alleged that the book was inherently defective because it
posed an unreasonable risk of harm by suggesting an experiment that
placed "dangerous instrumentalities of rubber bands and ruler in the
hands of fourth grade students. '69 The court rejected this claim and
held that the plaintiff was not injured by use of the book in the manner
in which it was designed to be used-to be read. 0 While the court
noted that one of the policies behind strict liability is to protect the
consumer from defective merchandise, 1 its holding appears to be
grounded in the fact that the book had no inherent defect in its physi-
cal properties which caused injury to the plaintiff. Presumably, a book
would be defective within the meaning of section 402A if, for example, a
sharp object embedded in the cover injured the plaintiff. This approach
to the application of strict liability theory is consistent with Cardozo
63. Cardozo, 342 So. 2d at 1056.
64. Phillips, Product Misrepresentation and the First Amendment, 18 IDAHO L. REv. 395,
398 (1982).
65. Cardozo, 342 So. 2d at 1056-57.
66. Id. at 1057.
67. Id.
68. 109 Misc. 2d 189, 439 N.Y.S.2d 821 (Sup. Ct. 1981), modified on other grounds, 88
A.D.2d 787, 451 N.Y.S.2d 533 (1982).
69. Id. at 190, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 822.
70. Id. at 191, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 822. The court also discussed first amendment problems asso-
ciated with imposing strict liability on publications. For a full discussion of the first amendment
concerns, see infra notes 149-65 and accompanying text.
71. Walter, 109 Misc. 2d at 191, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 822.
1989]
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and earlier case law.
The first strict liability case involving a magazine was the 1983 case
of Herceg v. Hustler Magazine.73 In Herceg the plaintiffs brought a
wrongful death suit against Hustler magazine alleging that a Hustler
article on autoerotic asphyxiation was a defective, unreasonably danger-
ous product which caused the plaintiffs' son and brother to hang them-
selves while trying to duplicate the sexual technique described in the
article. The United States District Court summarily dismissed the strict
liability claim. The court noted that no court has held that the content
of a publication is a product subject to liability under section 402A.74
The court stated that words are not a dangerous instrumentality to
which the policies of strict liability should apply.7 5 The court went on to
distinguish a magazine article from products including gunpowder, fire-
works, gasoline, and poison, which have clearly physical effects.7 Thus,
the court examined the nature of the product and found that the poli-
cies underlying strict liability do not apply to words, however atrocious
those words may be.
Two recent cases, Alm v. Van Nostrand Reinhold Co. 7 7 and Lewin
v. McCreight,7 8 shed further light on the applicability of strict liability
to books and magazines. Both cases involved claims based on a failure
to warn of "defective ideas" in "How To" books. Although both courts
characterized the failure to warn action in negligence terms, failure to
warn often is recognized as a basis for imposing strict liability in prod-
ucts litigation.79 Failure to warn involves negligence for selling a defec-
tive product, subject to the strict liability defenses and other
limitations on liability.80 Both courts refused to impose a duty to warn
of "defective ideas" on a publisher. The courts recognized that imposi-
tion of a duty to warn would place a tremendous burden on publishers,
would expose a publisher to potentially unlimited liability, and would
interfere with the important societal interest in free access to ideas.81
72. See supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text.
73. 565 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Tex. 1983), modified on other grounds, 814 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir.
1985).
74. Id. at 803.
75. Id.
76. Id. The written word is not "like a slingshot with physical properties which cause harm,
and which raises the question . . . whether, balancing of the magnitude of the risk against the
utility of defendants' conduct for society, the risk of harm in a particular case is unreasonable." Id.
(citing Moning v. Alfono, 400 Mich. 425, 254 N.W.2d 759 (1977)).
77. 134 Ill. App. 3d 716, 480 N.E.2d 1263 (1985).
78. 655 F. Supp. 282 (E.D. Mich. 1987).
79. See Phillips, supra note 64, at 400.
80. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 3, § 99, at 697; see also Parke-Davis & Co. v. Stromsodt,
411 F.2d 1390 (8th Cir. 1969).
81. Lewin, 655 F. Supp. at 284; Alm, 134 Ill. App. 3d at 718-19, 480 N.E.2d at 1267. Both
[Vol. 42:557
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Alm and Lewin are important cases because they arguably provide a
basis for the proposition that if courts are unwilling to allow a cause of
action involving negligence principles against a publication whose "de-
fective ideas" harm a plaintiff, they should not allow strict liability
claims against publications in similar situations.
B. Reports, Manuals, and Trade Publications
The first case involving strict liability for ideas beyond the sphere
of books and magazines was Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Employers Insur-
ance of Wausau.2 In Sears the plaintiff sued Sears for hand injuries
caused by erroneous information in a manual containing instructions
for the operation and maintenance of a radial arm saw. While the plain-
tiff did not allege a traditional strict liability claim, 3 the court noted
that the key issue to be decided was whether the manual constituted a
product for the purposes of an insurance policy.84 Employers Insurance
contended that it had no obligation to defend Sears because their
"product" policy only covered the physical manual, not the intellectual
content.8 5 The district court held that the manual was a product, and
because the policy made no distinction between the physical manual
and its intellectual content, Employers was obligated to defend the law-
suit against Sears.8  Given Cardozo and Walter, this holding in Sears is
disturbing. However, in a very prescient caveat, the court was careful to
note that a substantive defense may exist to the underlying cause of
action, 7 namely that a products liability action for "defective ideas"
may be inappropriate. Given existing case law, the Sears case should be
read narrowly to characterize the intellectual content of a manual as a
"product" only for insurance policy purposes.
A strict liability claim that a trade publication was a defective
product was advanced in Beasock v. Dioguardi Enterprises.8 In
Beasock the plaintiff's husband was killed by an explosion of a 16-inch
truck tire mistakenly mounted on a 16.5-inch rim. The complaint al-
cases also raised first amendment questions. For a discussion of first amendment problems associ-
ated with strict liability, see infra notes 149-65 and accompanying text.
82. 585 F. Supp. 739 (N.D. IMI. 1983).
83. Id. at 745. The district court noted that the plaintiff's claim appeared to be a negligence
claim for failure to warn. Id. As noted earlier, failure to warn claims properly can be characterized
as strict liability claims. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
84. Sears, 585 F. Supp. at 745.
85. Id. Employers also argued that the price of the policy, $9.00, was too low to cover any-
thing more than the physical book with its physical characteristics. A policy insuring injuries from
a saw presumably would be much higher. Id. at 743.
86. Id. at 744.
87. Id. at 745.
88. 130 Misc. 2d 25, 494 N.Y.S.2d 974 (Sup. Ct. 1985), rev'd, 117 A.D.2d 1015, 499 N.Y.S.2d
558 (1986) (reversing on issue of summary judgment).
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leged that the design of the rim was defective in that it allowed a 16-
inch tire to be mounted without difficulty, but when the mismatched
combination was attempted, the tire exploded. 9 The Tire & Rim Asso-
ciation (TRA) was named as a defendant because it published and dis-
tributed the tire and rim standards which were followed in mounting
the decedent's tires. TRA contended that it merely performed a service
by publishing tire and rim standards which facilitated the interchange-
ability of products within the automotive industry, but that such stan-
dards only were advisory and that adherence to them and their use was
entirely within the control and discretion of the manufacturer.90 The
district court held that the only products TRA was responsible for plac-
ing in the stream of commerce were its publications.9 1 Although these
publications contained the specifications for the tire and rim that ex-
ploded on the car, the court stated that "the publications themselves
did not produce the injuries" and, thus, could not serve as the basis for
strict products liability or breach of warranty.2 The court distinguished
TRA's role from that of a typical defendant in a strict products liability
action. 3 TRA was a trade association with the limited function of pub-
lishing dimensional specifications for interchangeability purposes.94 It
neither derived the economic benefits of a typical strict liability defend-
ant,95 nor was it in a position to spread the loss. The Beasock court
seemed to imply that the usual policies behind the imposition of strict
liability do not apply to a defendant who disseminates trade
publications.
Howard v. Poseidon Pools96 appears to follow this inference from
Beasock. The defendant in Howard was a manufacturer's trade associa-
tion which certified, reviewed, and recommended design changes in
swimming pools and pool equipment.9 7 The plaintiff made a strict lia-
bility claim against the association for crippling injuries that he had
received when he dove into a four foot deep pool that had been certified
in one of the defendant's publications. The Howard court followed
Beasock in holding that a trade association certifier of swimming pool
equipment is not the type of defendant against whom an action for
89. Id. at 26, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 976.
90. Id. at 28, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 977.
91. Id. at 29, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 978.
92. Id. at 29-30, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 978.
93. See id. at 32, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 979.
94. Id. at 32, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 979.
95. Id.
96. 133 Misc. 2d 50, 506 N.Y.S.2d 523 (Sup. Ct. 1986), afl'd in part, rev'd in part, 134 A.D.2d
926, 522 N.Y.S.2d 388 (1987).
97. Id. at 51, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 524.
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strict liability can be brought."' A trade association is not a manufac-
turer of a product. Further, the policies of strict liability do not apply
to a trade association because it is not in a position to insure against
the loss by passing the cost to the public in the form of higher prices.99
In one of the most novel product liability claims ever advanced, the
plaintiff in L. Cohen & Co. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.00 alleged that an
inaccurate credit report was a product within the meaning of the Con-
necticut Product Liability Act.101 The plaintiff asserted that it had suf-
fered harm because Dun & Bradstreet prepared and distributed a credit
report which erroneously indicated that the plaintiff was delinquent in
meeting its financial obligations.0 2 The district court dismissed the
plaintiff's product liability complaint and stated that it was not aware
of any products liability case involving a credit report as a product.10 3
The court also relied on the fact that the legislature did not intend to
extend coverage of the Connecticut Product Liability Act to books, re-
ports, periodicals, or other writings, but rather to "products of a more
tangible nature. 1 0 4 Finally, the court noted that "mere words" can give
rise to liability in a narrow line of failure to warn cases, but that the
actual injury in such cases is not caused by the words but rather by the
underlying product whose dangers were not disclosed properly.105
C. Aeronautical Charts
Despite what appears to be a trend in modern case law against im-
posing strict liability for "defective ideas," courts have refused to ex-
empt certain publications, such as aircraft instrument approach charts,
from the operation of section 402A. The first case applying strict liabil-
ity to an instrument approach chart was Aetna Casualty & Surety
Company v. Jeppesen & Co..106 In Aetna the survivors of a plane crash
98. Id. at 54, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 526.
99. Id.
100. 629 F. Supp. 1425 (D. Conn. 1986). Although the plaintiff did not assert a § 402A claim,
this case involved the question of whether a credit report was a product. See also Kennedy v.
Providence Hockey Club, 119 R.I. 70, 376 A.2d 329 (1977) (holding that purchase of a hockey
ticket for a game in which the plaintiff was injured while sitting in the stands was not a transac-
tion involving a product within the meaning of products liability).
101. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-572m (1982).
102. L. Cohen & Co., 629 F. Supp. at 1426.
103. Id. at 1430.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1430 n.6. An example would be a lawn mower with defective starting instructions.
Liability attaches because the erroneous instructions inextricably are tied to the product with
which they are sold, a product that causes the actual physical harm. The conclusion is consistent
with prior case law, and, thus, logically would remove books, magazines, and other publications not
sold with an underlying product from the sphere of strict liability.
106. 642 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1981).
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asserted that the crash was caused by a defective approach chart. The
chart had been prepared by Jeppesen by using the Federal Aviation
Administration's tabular compilations of instrument approach proce-
dures. 10 7 The error in the chart was that the graphic depiction of the
profile was drawn to the same scale as the graphic depiction of the plan,
when in fact the plan was five times the size of the profile.108 Both the
district court and the Ninth Circuit held that Jeppesen's chart was a
product for purposes of section 402A strict liability. 09 While the courts
simply asserted that the Jeppesen chart was a product without explain-
ing why, this finding was not challenged seriously by Jeppesen in the
Aetna cases. 1
Perhaps the reason why Jeppesen failed to challenge this finding
was that, at the time Aetna was decided, the only possible contrary
view was expressed in dicta in Times Mirror Co. v. Sisk."' Times Mir-
ror involved the fatal crash of a cargo jet into a mountain range outside
Manila. One of the plaintiffs' claims was that the defendant, Jeppesen,
was strictly liable under section 402A because the defective approach
chart did not show the presence of the mountains." 2 While the jury
found for Jeppesen, the trial judge granted judgment non obstante
verdicto."3 In reinstating the original verdict as sufficiently supportable
to be immune from judgment n.o.v., the appellate panel noted that it
had questioned whether the case was a products liability case."" How-
ever, even if the chart was considered to be a defective product, the
court concluded that pilot error was the proximate cause of the crash." 5
It was not until Halstead v. United States"6 that any court rendered a
thoughtful opinion as to why an aircraft approach chart should be con-
sidered a product for the purposes of section 402A.
Halstead involved the crash of a small private plane while attempt-
ing a full instrument landing at a West Virginia airfield. The plane had
the electronic equipment needed for a full instrument landing, but the
airfield did not. The pilot relied on a Jeppesen area chart which errone-
ously indicated that the airfield had a complete instrument landing sys-
tem. Because the airfield equipment could not inform the pilot of his
approach altitude, the pilot was unable to avoid descending his plane
107. Id. at 342.
108. Id.
109. Id.; see also Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Jeppesen & Co., 463 F. Supp. 94, 96 (1978).
110. Abney, Liability for Defective Aeronautical Charts, 52 J. AIR L. & COM. 323, 327 (1986).
111. 122 Ariz. 174, 593 P.2d 924 (Ct. App. 1978).
112. Id. at 175-77, 593 P.2d at 925-27.
113. Id. at 175, 593 P.2d at 925.
114. Id. at 177, 593 P.2d at 927.
115. Id. at 179, 593 P.2d at 929.
116. 535 F. Supp. 782 (D. Conn. 1982).
[Vol. 42:557
DEFECTIVE IDEAS
into a ridge. 117 Jeppesen contended that it could not be subject to strict
liability because it was rendering a service, not selling a product."' It
argued that the essence of its transactions with the airlines was the con-
veyance of information, and that the paper on which the map was
printed was merely the mode of conveying the information to subscrib-
ers." 9 Consequently, Jeppesen tried to compare its role to that of an
architect, engineer, or doctor-all service professionals. 120 The district
court rejected Jeppesen's arguments, holding that the chart was a prod-
uct for strict liability purposes.' 2 ' The court refused to engage in the
"product/service" semantic exercises because classification of the charts
as products conformed to the policy rationale behind section 402A.22
District Judge Eginton stated that the rationale of section 402A applied
because Jeppesen "mass produced and distributed its charts.' 2 3 He
noted that the comments to Restatement section 402A indicate that
strict liability was intended to place special liability on those who mass
distribute defective products to the general public.'2 ' Because of their
mass market feature, the approach charts were "fungible goods" and,
thus, fundamentally different from individualized architectural draw-
ings. 25 The court seemed to indicate that because Jeppesen mass pro-
duced and distributed thousands of charts on the aviation market, it
was like the traditional strict liability defendant who can bear the cost
by distributing the risk of injury through insurance and higher prices
better than the individual consumer. 126 The Second Circuit Court of
Appeals agreed with the district court's analysis that the policy justifi-
cations for strict liability applied to the Jeppesen charts. 127
117. Id. at 784-85.
118. Id. at 789. For a discussion of the transaction analysis, see supra notes 36-38 and ac-
companying text.
119. Halstead, 535 F. Supp. at 789.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 791.
122. Id. at 790-91.
123. Id. at 791.
124. Id.; see RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, supra note 2, § 402A comments c & f.
125. 535 F. Supp. at 791. The court noted analogous labor cases holding that plans, maps,
and plats could be goods. See Wirtz v. A.S. Giometti & Assocs., 399 F.2d 738 (5th Cir. 1968);
Schultz v. Merriman, 303 F. Supp. 1174 (D.N.H. 1969), modified on other grounds, 425 F.2d 228
(1st Cir. 1970).
126. For a description of the policy justifications behind strict liability, see supra notes 17-20
and accompanying text.
127. Saloomey v. Jeppesen & Co., 707 F.2d 671, 677 (2d Cir. 1983) (stating that "the mass
production and marketing of these charts requires Jeppesen to bear the costs of accidents that are
proximately caused by defects in the charts"), af'g Halstead v. United States, 535 F. Supp. 782 (D.
Conn. 1982). The court also noted:
By publishing and selling the charts, Jeppesen undertook a special responsibility, as seller, to
insure that consumers will not be injured by the use of the charts; Jeppesen is entitled-and
encouraged-to treat the burden of accidental injury as a cost of production to be covered by
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In 1985 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals followed the logic of
Halstead in Brocklesby v. United States.128 The court held that Jep-
pesen was strictly liable for publishing a defective United States gov-
ernment-created instrument approach procedure which resulted in the
crash of a cargo plane. Jeppesen argued that the government's instru-
ment approach procedure was a procedure, not a product." 9 Unper-
suaded by this argument, the Brocklesby court held that the mass
production and marketing aspects of the chart made it a defective prod-
uct subjecting Jeppesen to liability under section 402A."'5 As in Hal-
stead, the policy rationale of section 402A applied because Jeppesen
could spread the risk of loss. The court also noted the difference be-
tween aeronautical charts and the books and magazines in Cardozo,'13
Walter,13 2 and Herceg.33 The court stated that books and magazines
are not dangerous if they are used in their intended manner.13 4 Specifi-
cally, the court said that the plaintiff in Walter "'was not injured by
the use of the book for the purpose for which it was designed, i.e., to be
read,'" whereas Jeppesen's chart was "allegedly dangerous for the use
for which it was designed.'
135
The first state case to address whether instrument approach charts
constitute products under section 402A was Fluor Corp. v. Jeppesen &
Co.136 In Fluor a jet plane crashed into Johnson Hill at 2140 feet while
attempting to land in New York on a snowy night in 1972. Johnson
Hill, the highest point in the crash area, was not shown on the instru-
ment approach chart. Rather, the highest hill designated in the area
was only 1991 feet in elevation. In keeping with the federal courts' rea-
liability insurance.
Id. at 676-77.
128. 753 F.2d 794 (9th Cir.), amended on other grounds, 767 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 1101 (1986).
129. Id. at 800.
130. Id.; see also Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 656 F. Supp. 49, 66 (S.D.
Ohio 1986). In Cincinnati Gas, the court stated:
The doctrine of strict liability is primarily intended to impose special liability on those who
market defective products to the general public in a mass-production context. Even if the
Sargent and Lundy "design" could somehow be construed as a product for purposes of section
402A, the design was specially tailored to the Zimmer Plant and was not mass-produced.
Id. (citation omitted).
131. 342 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977). For a full discussion of Cardozo, see supra
notes 55-67 and accompanying text.
132. 109 Misc. 2d 189, 439 N.Y.S.2d 821 (Sup. Ct. 1981). For a full discussion of Walter, see
supra notes 68-72.
133. 565 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Tex. 1983). For a full discussion of Herceg, see supra notes 73-76
and accompanying text.
134. Brocklesby, 753 F.2d at 800 n.9.
135. Id. (quoting Walter, 109 Misc. 2d at 189, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 821).
136. 170 Cal. App. 3d 468, 216 Cal. Rptr. 68 (1985).
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soning in Halstead and Brocklesby, the California Court of Appeals
held that policy considerations made strict liability applicable to the
approach charts. 137 The court rejected as erroneous the trial court's
view that strict liability was applicable only to items whose physical
properties render them innately dangerous. 138
A persistent flaw in the decisions that hold Jeppesen strictly liable
for its aircraft instrument approach charts is the view that the policies
behind strict liability mandate such a result. Courts argue that because
aircraft charts are mass produced and marketed, the costs of injuries
resulting from defective charts can be borne best by the mass distribu-
tor. However, books and magazines also are mass produced, yet courts
consistently are unwilling to impose strict liability for "defective ideas"
which may be contained within them. In fact, it is likely that books and
magazines reach many more consumers than do aircraft approach
charts. Also, these charts are similar to books because a consumer is
purchasing the charts to obtain the information contained therein, not
the charts themselves. Charts disseminate information, the free flow of
which should not be impaired by the imposition of strict liability.'39
The privileged position of ideas, even in a commercial context, should
outweigh the underlying cost distribution policies of strict liability.
A second flaw in the reasoning of these decisions is that the usual
conditions triggering the imposition of strict liability are not present in
the case of aircraft charts. The doctrine of strict liability is designed to
protect persons injured by defective products on which they are forced
to rely and against which they are powerless to protect themselves. 40
However, Jeppesen provides its service, not to an uninformed and pow-
erless consumer, but rather to sophisticated airlines and pilots.' 4 ' Air-
line industry professionals have the technical expertise and the duty to
study the charts which they use and, thus, are not forced to rely on the
superior knowledge and expertise of the chart manufacturer.'42
137. Id. at 475, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 71.
138. Id. at 475, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 71-72. The court stated:
[A]lthough a sheet of paper might not be dangerous, per se, it would be difficult indeed to
conceive a salable commodity with more inherent lethal potential than an aid to aircraft navi-
gation that, contrary to its own design standards, fails to list the highest land mass immedi-
ately surrounding a landing site.
Id. at 476, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 71-72.
139. See Cardozo v. True, 342 So. 2d 1053, 1057 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
140. McCowan, Liability of the Chartmaker, 47 INs. CouNs. J. 359, 364 (1980).
141. Id.
142. Id. An argument can also be made that a chart manufacturer really is providing a ser-
vice. As McCowan notes:
A chart publisher who prepares an approach chart by gathering information already specified
by the appropriate authority and who depicts that information in such a manner as to be
more readily and efficiently used by instrument rated pilots, may fairly be seen as providing a
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An additional flaw in the Brocklesby analysis is the court's attempt
to contrast the fact that the aircraft chart was dangerous for the use for
which it was designed whereas a defective book was not dangerous for
its purpose.14 This distinction is not credible and should not be used to
exempt books, but not charts, from strict liability. Similar to a science
textbook, an aircraft chart is designed to be read. Further, the harm is
caused in both cases not by the physical properties of the publications,
but rather by carrying out the erroneous instructions contained within
the publication.""
The Fluor court made a similar erroneous leap of logic by disre-
garding a formidable body of case law and holding that a product need
not possess innate danger to fall within the scope of section 402A. This
conclusion directly contravenes the view that strict liability is not ap-
propriate for words, but only for products that cause the actual injury
because of some inherent defect."4 5
Finally, and most importantly, the courts holding that strict liabil-
ity applies to aircraft instrument approach charts have overlooked one
important policy consideration behind strict liability. Strict liability
was designed to relieve plaintiffs from the difficult burden of proving
negligence. 14 Many commentators argue that this consideration is the
most important policy justification for strict liability because otherwise,
given the virtual impossibility of proving negligence, the plaintiff likely
would be without a remedy.14 7 However, in the cases involving defective
aircraft instrument approach charts, negligence would be relatively easy
to prove. 48 For example, failing to list Johnson Hill as the highest point
near a landing site would constitute a prima facie case of negligence
because a reasonable chartmaker exercising due care in investigating
landmarks for the chart should have known or discovered that such a
hill existed. In sum, the policies underlying strict liability illustrate why
strict liability should not apply in cases of defective aircraft instrument
approach charts.
service rather than a product.
Id. at 365.
143. See Brocklesby, 753 F.2d at 800 n.9. For a discussion of this reasoning, see supra notes
134-35 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 43-54 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 43-54 and accompanying text.
146. Fluor, 170 Cal. App. 3d at 474-75, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 71.
147. See Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 460, 155 N.W.2d 55, 63 (1967).
148. See McCowan, supra note 140, at 369. McCowan notes, "[a]s a practical matter, it is
difficult to hypothesize a chart deficiency which would support a finding of a product defect that
would not also lead the trier of fact to find against the producer on a negligence theory." Id.
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III. IMPLICATIONS OF IMPOSING STRICT LIABILITY ON PUBLICATIONS
A. First Amendment Concerns
Given the United States Supreme Court's holdings in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan"14 and Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 50 there is a
serious question as to whether strict liability will be imposed for "defec-
tive" ideas.""' The holdings in Sullivan and Gertz, taken together, pro-
vide that strict liability is prohibited by the first amendment in
defamation actions. 2  To recover for defamation, a private plaintiff
must show some fault on the part of the defendant.153 Professor Jerry
Phillips has asserted that there is no meaningful distinction between
the speech interests involved in defamation suits and those interests
involved in a strict liability action.' 5 4 If this assertion is true, there
would be no greater interest in preventing tortious misconduct in either
case.155 Further, if suits based on innocent misstatements constitution-
ally are prohibited in defamation, they also logically should be prohib-
ited in strict liability cases. 56 It seems incongruous to afford an author
protection from strict liability when the cause of action is characterized
as one in defamation or other communication tort but offer no strict
liability protection when the action is characterized as one of products
liability. Imposing strict liability on writers and publishers under prod-
uct liability law effectively would nullify the constitutional constraints
on the law of defamation.157 This logic would apply to various forms of
commercial speech, 58 including credit reports159 and aircraft instru-
149. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
150. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). In both Sullivan and Gertz, the Supreme Court has recognized that
the imposition of tort liability on private defendants for the use of words involves state action,
which implicates the first and fourteenth amendments. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 265.
151. See generally Phillips, supra note 64.
152. Id. at 395. Phillips notes that some cases indicate even a negligence standard may be
constitutionally prohibited. Id. at 399; see, e.g., Libertelli v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., [1980-1981
Transfer Binder] Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 8968, at 20,573 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 1981) (stating that a
publisher cannot constitutionally be held liable "for false reports of matters of public interest ab-
sent knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth").
153. See Phillips, supra note 64, at 395. While the Phillips article focuses on Restatement §
402B misrepresentation rather than § 402A, both sections involve strict liability. The basic differ-
ence is that § 402B requires reliance on a "misrepresentation of a material fact concerning the
character or quality of a chattel." See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, supra note 2, § 402B.
154. Phillips, supra note 64, at 401-06. Phillips argues that the interests invaded the means
of communication used, and the nature of the speech involved in defamation actions bear only a
slight difference to those factors in a strict liability action. The differences are not enough to make
a constitutional difference, and thus a first amendment defense should be justified in strict liability
actions as well as defamation. Id.
155. See id. at 406.
156. Id.
157. See L. Cohen & Co. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 629 F. Supp. 1425, 1431 (D. Conn. 1986).
158. There is no essential constitutional distinction between speech in a defamation context
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ment approach charts, because the imposition of strict liability on com-
mercial publications would be a short step from the imposition of
liability without fault on an author or a publisher.16 0 Any attempts to
distinguish different types of publications for legal purposes would lead
to impermissible content-based first amendment discrimination.1 6,
Even if strict liability constitutionally could be imposed for mis-
statements or omissions in publications, its imposition likely would
have a chilling effect on authors and publishers.6 2 Strict liability would
discourage authors from writing and publishers from publishing be-
cause of a fear of exposure to liability from the vast number of plain-
tiffs that foreseeably would have access to their publications in the
mass market. s6 3 Anything that has the effect of discouraging the exer-
cise of a constitutional right should raise serious concerns. Given the
importance of the uninhibited exchange of ideas in a free society, im-
posing strict liability for erroneous information in publications would
create disturbing consequences. As the Aim court noted, the adverse
effect of strict liability on the public's free access to ideas would be "too
high a price to pay. "164 Society's interest in the "untrammeled dissemi-
nation of knowledge" should override all other policy concerns. 6 5
B. Effect on New Industries
Imposing strict liability for defective words or ideas also could
hamper the development of new processes and technologies. This result
is very likely in the area of computer software. 6 6 Computer software is
not a tangible product. Programs and data are "entities that exist as
patterns," 67 unlike chattels to which section 402A is designed to ap-
and commercial speech. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Coun-
cil, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
159. Credit reports are a form of commercial speech protected by the first and fourteenth
amendments. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
160. See L. Cohen & Co., 629 F. Supp. at 1431.
161. Alm v. Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., 134 I1. App. 3d 716, 722, 480 N.E.2d 1263, 1267
(1985). The court noted the first amendment problem raised by attempting to distinguish bad
advice in a "how to" book from that in a treatise or great work of literature. Id.
162. See id. at 722, 480 N.E.2d at 1267; Walter v. Bauer, 109 Misc. 2d 189, 191, 439 N.Y.S.2d
821, 822-23 (Sup. Ct. 1981).
163. As the court in Walter noted, "[w]ould any author wish to be exposed to liability for
writing on a topic which might result in physical injury, e.g., how to cut trees, how to keep bees?"
109 Misc. 2d at 191, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 823.
164. Alm, 134 Ill. App. 3d at 722, 480 N.E.2d at 1267.
165. Demuth Dev. Corp. v. Merck & Co., 432 F. Supp. 990, 993 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
166. See Freed, Products Liability in the Computer Age, 12 FORUM 461 (1977); Walker,
supra note 5, at 12-15.
167. Comment, Computer Software and Strict Products Liability, 20 SAN DIEGO L. Rav. 439,
442 (1983) (citing 2 R. DIDDAY, HOME COMPUTERS: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS (1977)).
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ply.6 8 It has been argued that the output produced by a computer is
the computer's way of communicating the functions that it has per-
formed, in much the same way that humans use speech to communicate
thoughts.16 9 Thus, computer output would be comparable to the written
expression of ideas.1 70 If courts are willing to apply strict liability for
defective ideas in aircraft approach charts, they likely will do so for
defective computer programs. This analogous application will create
problems because many computer software manufacturers believe
themselves to be service providers.' As service providers, they gener-
ally fall to obtain appropriate products liability insurance coverage.1 72
One mistake in the thousands of bits of information in a program might
expose them to tremendous potential liability. This potential liability
could cause many manufacturers to cease production of software that is
vital to managing the world's affairs.'73
The rationale behind the court's decision in Fluor Corp. v. Jep-
pesen & Co.17 4 particularly should be disturbing to computer software
manufacturers and others involved in public projects. The Fluor court
applied strict liability to the aircraft chart not because the chart had
inherently dangerous properties, but because the potential loss of life
from the omission of Johnson Hill on the chart was tremendous. 75 The
magnitude of the harm was so great that the policies behind strict lia-
bility were deemed to apply. 76 This policy justification for finding strict
liability may have far reaching implications. 1 Computer software use
has become more widespread in society, particularly in running hospi-
tals and controlling public transportation. 78 Other professions also
should be concerned. By focusing on the nature of the harm resulting
from a defective idea in a publication or intangible good rather than the
inherent dangerousness of the publication or good itself, an incalculable
number of items could expose manufacturers or distributors to strict
liability.'79 The threat of strict liability may halt the development of
emerging industries or cause existing businesses to raise their prices
drastically to cover sky-rocketing insurance rates. 80 This potential lia-
168. Id. at 445.
169. Freed, supra note 166, at 474-77.
170. Id.
171. See Walker, supra note 5, at 2.
172. Id.
173. See id.
174. See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
175. Fluor, 170 Cal. App. 3d at 476, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 71-72.
176. See id. at 475, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 71.
177. Walker, supra note 5, at 14.
178. See id.
179. See id. at 14-15.
180. Id. at 1-2, 15; see also Andresky, A World Without Insurance?, FORBES, July 15, 1985, at
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bility may force many producers of beneficial technology out of busi-
ness entirely. 181 In any event, the societal costs of imposing strict
liability in these situations may be too great for the commercial system
to bear.'82
V. CONCLUSION
Strict liability should not be imposed on publications that contain
erroneous or defective information. Ideas are not commercial products,
and imposing strict liability on those who distribute information would
have a chilling effect on first amendment freedoms. Authors and pub-
lishers would be dissuaded from disseminating their publications be-
cause the risk of liability would be so tremendous. While policy
arguments may be made in favor of imposing strict liability on publica-
tions, these policies are outweighed by the important need for the free
flow of ideas. In order to survive, a democratic society depends on unin-
hibited free trade in the marketplace of ideas.
Second, to impose strict liability on an item whose physical proper-
ties contain no inherent danger would be to violate the intent of section
402A. The comments to section 402 seem to indicate that the provision
only was intended to apply to factual situations in which the product
itself caused the injury. Also, one of the most important policy justifica-
tions for strict liability under section 402A, to remove the difficult bur-
den of proving negligence, would not be present in cases involving
publications. A plaintiff easily could prove that a reasonable defendant
would have exercised care in investigating, writing, proofreading, and
publishing.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the imposition of strict lia-
bility likely will hamper, and potentially will preclude, the development
of socially important products. Many manufacturers of important new
technology may find the potential liability under section 402A to be too
heavy a burden to bear and, thus, cease to produce their products. Soci-
ety will suffer greatly if innovative products, including computer
software packages and other articles of property used to transmit infor-
mation or solve problems, remain undeveloped.
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